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INTRODUCTION

[A]nd when [they] . . . presented their case against him and
asked for his conviction . . . I told them that Romans are not
accustomed to give any man up before the accused has met his
accusers face to face and has been given a chance to defend himself against the charges.
Acts of the Apostles, 25:14-16

One of the most difficult problems in constitutional interpretation
that has recently confronted the United States Supreme Court has been
when two defendants are being jointly tried and one of the defendants has
made an incriminating out of court statement which implicates his codefendant. The problem arises when the prosecution seeks to introduce the
inculpatory statement into evidence at the joint trial and the declarant
claims his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, thus
refusing to either affirm or repudiate the confession. There is no doubt
under these circumstances that the confession may properly be entered
into evidence against the maker. But unless there is a specific statutory
hearsay exception in effect allowing a confession made after the commission of a substantive offense to be admissible into evidence against both
the declarant and his co-conspirator, it is clear that the confession may
not be properly considered as evidence against a non-declaring codefendant.
* Former Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
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Nevertheless, a jury, having seen the defendants joined together in
both the indictment and the trial and having heard the confession of one
defendant which implicates the other, may naturally assume the guilt of
the non-declarant based upon the confession of his codefendant. The propriety of this assumption is not questioned here, for to do so would be to
attempt an invasion of the province of the jury. What is questioned, however, is the reliability of the process by which a jury determines the guilt
or innocence of a criminal defendant, where the accused has been denied
the opportunity to cross-examine the most damning witness against himhis non-testifying codefendant.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " The threshold ques-

tion to be answered is whether a defendant who confesses, implicating his
codefendant, and who refuses to testify before the jury as to the facts surrounding his alleged confession is a "witness" within the meaning of the
sixth amendment's confrontation clause. If the above question is answered
affirmatively, then it would appear that the right of confrontation would
attach. But what is the "right of confrontation" and what does it entail?
Is the "right of confrontation" merely comparable with the right of crossexamination? Or is the right of cross-examination merely a component of
the undefinable entity, confrontation? These are some of the thornier
problems implicit in any attempt to define the meaning of this constitutional provision.
In 1968 the United States Supreme Court took a major step forward
in interpreting the scope of criminal protection afforded by the confrontation clause with its decision in Bruton v. United States.' Bruton held
that the use of limiting instructions to a jury to disregard a codefendant's
confession when determining the guilt of a non-declarant constituted a
violation of the confrontation clause, where the declarant's confession implicated his codefendant and the declarant claimed his privilege against
self-incrimination.
It was possible in 1968 to view Bruton as a landmark decision in the
struggle to expand the confrontation clause beyond the cursory right to
cross-examine witnesses who actually testified in the presence of the jury.
However, three decisions of the United States Supreme Court subsequent
to Bruton have made it apparent that a majority of the Court no longer
considers the confrontation clause sufficient to cover confessing codefendant situations. The first decision to undercut the efficacy of Bruton was
Harrington v. California.' In Harrington the Supreme Court held that
there were some violations of the confrontation clause which in the context of a particular case could be declared harmless error. Shortly after
the appointments of Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justice Black1. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
2. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
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mun, the Court decided Dutton v. Evans.' There it was held that a state
statute, which extended the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule to
any statements made after the commission of a substantive offense (i.e.,
the concealment phase of the conspiracy), did not violate the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Again this result was reached despite the fact
that the declarant claimed his privilege against self-incrimination and was
not available for cross-examination as to whether he actually made the
statement attributed to him.
The most recent case, Schneble v. Florida,' held the admission of a
codefendant's confession to be harmless error where the defendant, who
was implicated in the confession, had also confessed. Schneble was a
retaliatory attack by Florida upon the rationale of Bruton, and its acceptance by a majority of the United States Supreme Court can be considered
the final blow in the recent battle to delimit the right of confrontation in
"the confessing codefendant" situations.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF CODEFENDANT'S CONFESSIONSSOME SOLUTIONS WHICH FAILED

Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bruton v.
United States,5 it was axiomatic that extrajudicial statements made by one
conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy and prior to its termination in
a substantive offense were admissible against all other co-conspirators
under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.' The theory upon
which these statements were admitted into evidence was that the declarant was the agent of the other co-conspirators and the admissions of one
were the admissions of all; the admissions were themselves considered
steps in the execution of the common purpose.' However, statements made
by a conspirator not in furtherance of the conspiracy 8 or after the conspiracy had ended in the commission of a substantive offense 9 were admissible
only against the declarant and not against his non-declaring codefendant.
These considerations are the sources of a problem which remains unsolved today.
A device was needed [by the prosecutors] ... which would permit the use of this highly probative evidence as against the
declarant and, at the same time, protect the interests of the nonconfessor during a joint trial.' °
3. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
4. 92 S. Ct. 1056 (1972).
5. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
6. See, e.g., Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) ; Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892). Cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
7. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) ; Clune v. United States, 159 U.S.
590 (1896).
8. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
9. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949). Cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1971).
10. Note, 35 BROOK. L. REV. 139, 140 (1968).
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Two devices traditionally proffered to the courts to protect the
non-confessing defendant, but still enabling a confession to be used
against the confessor at a joint trial, were redaction and limiting instructions. Redaction involved the deletion from a confession of all references
to a non-confessing codefendant." When the references to the nondeclarant were deleted, it was supposedly impossible for the jury to consider the confession against the non-declarant. A variation on this theme
was the substitution of a fictitious name for that of the non-declarant in
the text of the confession. Each time the non-confessing codefendant's
name appeared in the confession it was replaced with "Mr. X" or "Mr.
Blank."' 2 In order for the deletion to be effective, all indirect references
to the non-declarant must have been excluded." Therefore, once the identity of the non-confessor was established, not only his name, but any portion of the confession which might have inculpated the codefendant had
to be stricken.' 4
However, the problem still remains, that any intelligent juror is
likely to come to the conclusion that the mysterious "Mr. X" is in actuality the codefendant of the confessor.
The jury having seen the defendants tried together and having
heard the confession alluding to "Mr. X," it seems unrealistic to
assume that the jurors will not deduce the real identity of the
mysterious "anonymous nobody.""
Taking a realistic view of the situation, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Greenwell v. United
States,'6 and Jones v. United States, 7 that when a codefendant's name was
deleted from a confession that incriminated another, it was error, although
perhaps not constitutional error, to admit the confession into evidence at
a joint trial when other evidence made it reasonable to assume that the
anonymous references pertained to the non-declaring codefendant. The
court indicated that if such admissions were intended to be introduced
into evidence, separate trials would be necessary. 8
The second alternative available to the courts was the use of limiting
instructions to the jury. The purpose of these limiting instructions was to
11. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407
P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965). In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the
Supreme Court mentioned but did not pass on the practice of redaction.
12. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
13. People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
14. Id. at 530, 407 P.2d at 273, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 361. A further limitation imposed by
the courts demands that all deletions be without prejudice to the declarant. The concern
is not only with the confessor's right to have the jury consider the entire text of the statement but also with the jury's interest in hearing all of the evidence against the declarant.
Note, 35 Mo. L. Rv. 125 (1970).
15. Note, 35 Mo. L. REv. 125, 127-28 (1970).
16. 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 923 (1965).
17. 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
18. See Calloway v. United States, 399 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 987 (1968).
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allow an inculpatory statement or confession to be introduced into evidence in toto, while eliminating the prejudicial harm to the non-confessor.
Serious questions have been raised by this procedure.
The efficacy of effacing the prejudicial hearsay from the minds
of jurors via admonitions and instructions delimiting the use of
evidence is difficult to ascertain and depends on whether one
views the jury as composed of twelve men of average intelligence
or twelve men of average ignorance. 19
As the evidentiary rules regarding the admissibility of a confession
inculpating a codefendant were applied in joint trials, some courts were
skeptical of the effectiveness of limiting instructions.2" Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court in Blumenthal v. United States2' held that the trial judge's
limiting instructions to the jury had sufficiently protected a non-confessing codefendant and left "no room for doubt that the admissions were
adequately excluded .... 22 The Court did recognize, however, the danger
that the jury might disregard the court's instructions." Although it was
possible that the jury would consciously or unconsciously consider the
confession in determining the guilt of the non-confessor, the Court held
that under the circumstances the risk was minimal.
Ten years later in Delli Paoli v. United States,2 4 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its decision in Blumenthal. The government's evidence in
Delli Paoli consisted of the testimony of eyewitnesses and the confession
of one codefendant, which was admitted into evidence with the normal
limiting instructions. In holding that under all the circumstances it was
reasonable to assume that the jury had followed the judge's instructions
and, therefore, the petitioner had been sufficiently protected, the majority
relied on the fact that the instructions were sufficiently clear and that it
was reasonably possible for the jury to follow them. 5 The basic premise
for the decision was, however, an unshakable faith in the jury system.
To say that the jury might have been confused amounts to
19. Note, 35 BROOK. L. REV. 139, 140 (1968).
20. An instruction to a jury to limit the use of a confession to a particular defendant
to the exclusion of other codefendants is a
device which satisfies form while it violates substance; that is, the recommendation
to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but
anybody else's.
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932).
21. 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
22. Id. at 551-52.
23. The danger was a real one. "Perhaps even at best the safeguards provided . . . are
insufficient to ward off the danger entirely." Id. at 559.
24. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
25. Id. at 239-42. The Court considered five factors to be important in determining
whether the instructions to the jury, to consider the confession of a non-testifying codefendant as evidence only against the declarant, were actually followed: The simplicity of the
conspiracy; the adequacy of the protection afforded the defendant's individual interest; the
point in time the confession was admitted; the contents of the confession; and the lack of any
indication of confusion.
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nothing more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to
follow instructions.2 6
The minority in Delli Paoli subscribed to Judge Frank's dissent in
the Court of Appeals 27 and admonished the government not to gain the
advantage of having the jury be "influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider, but which [as a
matter of fact] they cannot put out of their minds. 28
Although Delli Paoli neither held nor purported to establish an absolute rule that juries are presumed to have followed the court's instructions,
trial courts seldom granted severances and appellate courts were reluctant
to reverse trial court decisions. Although there was widespread criticism
of the belief that the jury could or would follow the court's instructions
Paoli situation, only a small minority of states abandoned the
in a Delli
29
rule.
III.

THE EROSION OF

Delli Paoli

That the Supreme Court finally overruled Delli Paoli is perhaps not
as interesting as the manner in which it was accomplished. Rarely, if ever,
does the Court render a decision that suddenly reshapes a major portion
of criminal law. Rather, the Court moves very cautiously, attempting to
telegraph its every move as it gently chips away at anachronistic interpretations of the Constitution that it wishes to re-evaluate. In so doing
the Court attempts to create the facade of an unchanging body of "constitutional law." Bruton was no exception to this doctrine of constitutional
resiraint for it was preceded by three seemingly unrelated decisions of the
Court, each foreshadowing the eventual reversal of Delli Paoli.
The most significant harbinger of the demise of Delli Paoli was
Jackson v. Denno.8 ° This case was the first signal to state and federal
trial courts that the rationale upon which limiting instructions were based
was no longer acceptable to a majority of the Supreme Court. In Jackson
26. Id. at 242.
27. Judge Frank prescribed the following formula to govern joint trials:
When several defendants are on trial for criminal conspiracy, if the government seeks
to put in evidence an out of court statement by one defendant which is hearsay as
to the others (i.e., an out of court statement made after the conspiracy has
terminated) then
(a) unless all references to the other defendants can be effectively deleted (so
that the statement will contain no hint of the others' guilt) and unless those references are deleted,
(b) the trial judge must (1) refuse to admit the statement or (2) sever the
trial of those other defendants.
United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
28. 352 U.S. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29. See Note, The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession after Bruton v. United

States: The Questions and a Proposal for their Further Resolution, 1970
332-33.
30. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

DUKE

L.J. 329,
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the Court determined that New York procedure which allowed a jury to
first determine the voluntariness of a confession and then determine the
defendant's guilt or innocence, with instructions to disregard any involuntary confession, was a violation of due process. Especially significant was
the Court's explicit rejection of the proposition that a properly instructed
jury could be expected to disregard an involuntary confession when determining the confessor's guilt. The Court based its rejection of limiting instructions in this instance upon Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Delli
Paoli which had characterized limiting instructions as "intrinsically ineffective"'" and a "futile collocation of words .. which fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against whom such a declaration
'3 2
should not tell."
Most lower federal courts undoubtedly understood the implications
of Jackson because they were used to looking to the Supreme Court for
binding precedent, but the state courts obviously were not so accustomed.
Soon after Jackson, however, the Supreme Court did manage to catch the
attention of the state courts in much the same way a headmaster is forced
to attract the attention of unruly or inattentive students-with a well
placed whack with a ruler. The whack came in the form of Pointer v.
Texas,3 which held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
was binding upon the states through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer
was followed immediately by Douglas v. Alabama,3 4 the object lesson of
the whack. In Douglas, a co-indictee who had been separately tried was
called as a witness by the state prosecutor. After the witness had invoked
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,35 the prosecutor,
under the guise of refreshing the memory of a hostile witness, read to the
jury the witness' confession implicating the petitioner. 6
Speaking for a unanimous Court,37 Justice Brennan held that this
practice constituted a denial of petitioner's right to cross-examination
secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Under the
circumstances the jury could not be expected to disregard the reading of
the confession, and Douglas was precluded from cross-examining one who
had invoked the fifth amendment and thus refused to affirm or disaffirm
the confession. 8
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Jackson, Pointer, and Douglas, the holding of Bruton v. United States should not have been totally
unexpected. On a philosophical basis, Delli Paoli had been overruled
before certiorari was ever granted to George Bruton.
31. 352 U.S. at 247.
32. Id.
33. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
34. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
35. The co-indictee planned to appeal his convictions and refused to answer any questions
concerning his alleged crimes. Id. at 416.
36. The confession itself was never offered into evidence.
37. Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result.
38. 380 U.S. at 419.
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Delli Paoli

Evans and Bruton were jointly indicted and tried in federal district
court on charges of armed postal robbery. The prosecution's evidence included, inter alia, Evans' confession implicating Bruton. Neither defendant took the stand. In admitting the testimony of a postal officer, which
included Evans' confession, the trial judge instructed 9 the jury that the
confession was hearsay and therefore inadmissible as to Bruton. The trial
judge further instructed the jury to disregard Evans' confession in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. At the close of the trial the court repeated its instructions to the jury. No exceptions were taken by Bruton's
counsel, and both defendants were convicted and sentenced to twenty-five
years imprisonment.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Evans' conviction was reversed.40 Bruton's conviction was affirmed,
however, in reliance upon Delli Paoli.4 On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court per Mr. Justice Brennan reversed Bruton's conviction.
[B]ecause of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial
statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans'
confession in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of crossby the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
examination 4secured
2
Amendment.
In overruling Delli Paoli, the Court stated that Jackson v. Denno
had repudiated the basic premise upon which Delli Paoli stood-that it
was reasonably possible for a jury to follow sufficiently clear instructions
to disregard a non-testifying codefendant's confession when determining
his codefendant's guilt." The Court called the "naive assumption that
39. The instruction stated in part:
A confession made outside of court by one defendant may not be considered as
evidence against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way a party
to the confession. Therefore . . . you should consider it as evidence in the case
against Evans, but you must not consider it, and should disregard it, in considering
the case against Bruton.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125 n.2 (1968).
40. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967). On retrial, Evans was
acquitted. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124-25 (1968). However, Evans was
subsequently convicted of two crimes in the state of Missouri and then testified over the
objection of defense counsel at Bruton's retrial. Bruton was again convicted. United States v.
Bruton, 416 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1969).
41. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
42. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
43. Id. Although not relied on by the Court in Bruton, substantial empirical evidence
had been generated supporting the distrust of the capacity of a jury to ignore prejudicial
evidence. One jury project conducted by the University of Chicago on a Ford Foundation
grant gave certain concrete support to the argument that, in fact, jurors did react to
prejudicial evidence when they had been instructed to disregard it.
This project constructed a personal injury suit on tape and played it to thirty
experimental juries. Before ten juries the defendant reveals that he has no liability
insurance, no objection being taken by plaintiff's counsel. The mean award of the
ten juries was 33,000 dollars. Before another ten juries the defendant reveals that he
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prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury" a theory
'
The
which all practicing attorneys know to be "unmitigated fiction."44
into
evidence
of
segregating
incapable
Court concluded that a jury is
"separate intellectual boxes," 4 and
[i]t cannot determine that a confession is true insofar as it
admits that A has committed acts with B and at the same time
effectively ignore the inevitable conclusion that B has committed
those acts with A.46
As further justification for its actions in Bruton, the Supreme Court
pointed to the amendment in 1966 of Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 14 authorizes a severance where it appears that
a defendant might be prejudiced by a joint trial.4 7 It was amended in 1966
to provide that the court may order the government's prosecutor to deliver
any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at trial to the court for inspection
in camera.48 The 1966 amendment of Rule 14 was the last overt indication
by the Supreme Court that it was considering further expansion of the
right of confrontation in codefendant confession situations. During the
intervening two years between the rule change and Bruton, the amendment went virtually unnoticed. From an historical viewpoint, it is difficult
to perceive how the eventuality of a decision under Bruton-type circumstances could have been made more obvious.
V.

RETROACTIVITY AND THE RULE OF Roberts v. Russell

If federal and state prosecutors greeted Bruton with something less
than open arms, then their outlook on life must have been darkened further when, three weeks later, the Court held Bruton retroactive. 49 The
holding was required, the Court said, because the error in Bruton created
has no liability insurance. Once again no objection was taken. The award was 37,000
dollars. Before the third group of juries it is revealed that the defendant has liability
insurance and there is objection by defendant's counsel. The judge accordingly
instructed the jury to disregard the insurance. The mean award for this group of
juries was 46,000 dollars.
Broeder, University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959).
This apparent demonstration of jury irregularity lends credence to the argument that
in some instances the jury functions best only when highly prejudicial information is withheld
from it.
44. 391 U.S. at 129, quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949).
45. 391 U.S. at 131, quoting People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 529, 407 P.2d 265, 272, 47
Cal. Rptr. 353, 360 (1965).
46. Id.
47. Joinder of defendants is governed by FED. R. CRM. P. 8(b) and 14.
The rules are designed to promote economy and efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity
of trials, where these objectives can be achieved without substantial prejudice
to the rights of the defendants to a fair trial.
Daley v. United States, 231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir. 1956).
48. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 (as amended) (emphasis added).
49. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

a "serious [flaw] in the fact finding process at trial,"5 and "went to the
basis of [a] fair hearing and trial."'" Reliance by state and federal courts
upon the standards of Delli Paoli was not regarded as persuasive. 52 In
view of Jackson v. Denno and other decisions,55 as well as the continued
attack upon Delli Paoli from its inception, the Court felt that reliance,
albeit in good faith, was unjustified. This position misstates the fact that
the vast majority of American trial courts did, in reality, rely on limiting
instructions to cure the Bruton defect. Nevertheless, the Court stated that
even though the impact of retroactive application upon the administration
of criminal justice "may be significant, the constitutional error presents
issue of guilt or innocence may not have been relia serious risk that the
4
ably determined.

'8

The decision in Roberts, although consistent with previous retroactive holdings involving the sixth amendment jury trial provision,5 5 did
add some confusion to other issues created by Bruton. The retroactive
holding of Roberts suggested that the admission of a non-testifying codefendant's confession constituted a per se violation of a defendant's right
of confrontation and required an automatic reversal, because the Court
generally has held retroactive only those cases which require automatic
reversal. 6 Yet the Court's remand of the case to the district court for further proceedings also suggested that reversal was not considered automatic. Indeed, a claim was made that the remand of Roberts indicated
that the admission of a confession made by a non-testifying codefendant
was not a per se violation of the confrontation clause. 57 However, the
remanding of three cases58 subsequent to Roberts wherein the codefendant
50. Id. at 294, quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967).
51. Id., quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 n.20 (1965). In Linkletter, the
Court denied habeas corpus relief from a state conviction which, although based upon
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, had become final before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), was decided. The primary purpose of Mapp in overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949), was to deter police misconduct by the exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable searches. In attempting to reconcile its expansion of the concept of fair trial with the
need to avoid excessive burdens upon the administration of justice, the Court in Linkletter
declined to apply Mapp retroactively because a violation of the exclusionary rule did not
render the fact finding process unreliable, since the evidence was undeniably trustworthy,
albeit illegally siezed. See Comment, Bruton v. United States: A Belated Look at the Warren
Court Concept of Criminal Justice, 44 ST. JORN's L. REv. 55, 75-76 (1969).
52. Contra, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), holding not retroactive, Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineups).
53. See note 56 infra.
54. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968).
55. See cases collected in Note, The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession after
Bruton v. United States: The Questions and a Proposal for their Further Resolution, 1970
DUKE L.J. 329, 336 n.51.
56, Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968), citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) ; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
57. See note, The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession after Bruton v. United States:
The Questions and a Proposal for their Further Resolution, 1970 DuKE L.J. 329, 336 n.53.
58. Hunt v. Connecticut, 392 U.S. 304 (1968); Santoro v. United States, 392 U.S. 301
(1968) ; Bujese v. United States, 392 U.S. 297 (1968).
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did take the stand apparently indicated that the Supreme Court was
not defining the scope of Bruton when it remanded Roberts.
Six months after the Roberts decision, the Supreme Court provided
the first evidence that not all uses of a non-testifying codefendant's confession constituted a denial of the right of confrontation. In Frazier v.
Cupp, 9 the prosecutor included in his opening statement a summary of
the testimony that he expected a codefendant, who had pleaded guilty, to
give. The summary suggested that the testimony would implicate the petitioner, but as in Bruton, Roberts, and Douglas, the codefendant invoked
his privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify. In holding that
Bruton did not require a reversal, the Court distinguished Frazier on the
basis that the "mental gymnastics" required of the jury in Bruton were
not present in Frazier." Furthermore, the Court made mention of the fact
that the allusion to the confession was contained in the opening statement
and was not entered into evidence as in Bruton. Therefore, it was possible
for the jury to easily segregate the information.
The most important feature of the Court's decision, however, was the
majority's emphasis on the confession not being a vital part of the prosecution's case. This was the first concrete indication that the mere admission of a non-testifying codefendant's confession would not be considered
by the Court to be grounds for automatic reversal. It was also the first
indication of a willingness on the part of the Court to consider a violation
of the confrontation clause as harmless constitutional error.
VI.

Bruton

AND THE HARMLESS-ERROR

RULE-CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFUSION

The problem previously alluded to-the uncertainty concerning the
retroactive scope of Bruton-was a result of the Court's failure in
Roberts to define precisely the relationship between a denial of confrontation of a non-testifying codefendant and the harmless-constitutionalerror rule first formulated in Chapman v. California."' Chapman involved a prosecutor who had commented at length during his summation
to the jury upon the defendants' failure to testify and the permissible
inferences of guilt implicit in their silence. 2 Prior to the defendants'
59. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
60. Id. at 735. The Court in Frazier twice spoke of the importance of the codefendant's
extra-judicial statement in the prosecution's case. The Court first observed that "unlike the
situation in either Douglas or Bruton, [the codefendant's] statement was not a vitally important part of the prosecution's case." It then concluded:
At least where the anticipated, and unproduced, evidence is not touted to the jury
as a crucial part of the prosecution's case, "it is hard for us to imagine that the
minds of the jurors would be so influenced by such incidental statements during this
long trial that they would not appraise the evidence objectively and dispassionately."
Id. at 736, quoting United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 239 (1940).
61. 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967).
62. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides:
[11n any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain
or deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be corn-
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appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the United States Supreme
Court held that the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibited such
comment upon a defendant's failure to testify on his own behalf." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of California applied the state's harmlesserror rule, 4 holding that the error did not result in a "miscarriage of
justice." 5 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
convictions, holding that an error was not harmless where it was reasonably possible that the error "contributed to the conviction." 6 "[B] efore
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be
able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."6 7
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Black specifically declined to
adopt a rule that all federal constitutional errors could never be regarded
as harmless, realizing that to do so would require the automatic reversal
of all convictions so obtained."8 Chapman's conviction was reversed,
however, because the constitutional right involved was so fundamental
to a fair trial that its infraction could never be treated as harmless
error."9 Nevertheless, Justice Black's opinion also concluded that there
might be "some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular
case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with
the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the auto70
matic reversal of the conviction.1
Roberts v. Russell established that the use of limiting instructions
to a jury to obviate the denial of confrontation of a non-testifying codefendant presented a "serious risk" that the issue of guilt might not
have been reliably determined. The question remained whether the right
of confrontation of a non-testifying codefendant, whose confession implicating his codefendant has been introduced into evidence, is a right so
fundamental to a fair trial that its infraction can never be regarded as
71
harmless error.
It was into this mold that the Supreme Court injected Harrington v.
California.72 Harringtoninvolved the joint trial of four defendants, three
of whom had confessed implicating Harrington. 7' All three confessions
mented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court
or jury.
63. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
64. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 43/2 required the affirmation of the conviction unless "the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."
65. People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 197, 404 P.2d 209, 220, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 740 (1965).
66. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 24. Accord, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1964).
68. Id. at 21-22.
69. Id. at 24-26.
70. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 23. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
72. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
73. Harrington had objected that his trial was not severed from his codefendants. Id.
at 252.
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were introduced into evidence with limiting instructions"4 that the jury
was to consider each confession only against its maker. Only one codefendant took the stand and he was cross-examined by Harrington's
attorney. 75 Harrington's own statements, which fell short of a confession,
placed him at the scene of the crime.76 Other witnesses, including the
victims, identified Harrington and likewise placed him at the scene. Upon
these special facts a majority of the Court concluded that the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the two defendants who did not testify
constituted harmless error under Chapman. The Court's decision, according to Mr. Justice Douglas, was based purely upon the evidence
contained in the record.
The case against Harrington was not woven from circumstantial
evidence. It is so overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this
state conviction undisturbed.77
Speaking for the minority, 78 Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that
Harrington had overruled Chapman, the very case it purported to apply.
Chapman was interpreted as having "left no doubt that for an error to
be 'harmless' it must have made no contribution to a criminal conviction. ' 79 Thus, Brennan decried what he considered to be a shift of the
test from "whether the constitutional error contributed to the conviction
to whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming' support for
the conviction .
,,"o
It is arguable whether Harrington diluted the "test" of Chapman."'
Justice Douglas was careful to point out in his opinion that Chapman
admonished "against giving too much emphasis to 'overwhelming evidence' of guilt .. ...
, Nevertheless, it was implied that in view of the
"overwhelming" weight of evidence, Harrington simply had no "substantial rights" which were violated by the denial of confrontation."3 In
the final analysis it appears that the Court declined to protect against
the possibility of harm, preferring instead to guess as to the "probable
'84
impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.
It should be noted at this point that because Harrington was tried
74. Harrington was tried before the decision in Bruton, but his case was decided by the
Supreme Court after Bruton.
75. Rhone, the only defendant to testify, placed Harrington inside the store, gun in hand,
during the robbery. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253 (1969).
76. Harrington admitted that one defendant, Bosby, was the "trigger man;" that he fled
with the other three defendants; and that after the murder of the store keeper he dyed his
hair and shaved his moustache. Id.
77. Id. at 254.
78. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in his dissent.
79. 395 U.S. at 255.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. See section VIII infra.
82. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
83. Id.
84. Id,
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before Bruton was decided, Harrington is not absolute authority for the
proposition that Chapman is always applicable to a violation of Bruton.
It is possible that a future Supreme Court may limit Harrington to a
definition of the retroactive scope of Bruton and apply an automatic reversal test to cases tried after Bruton. Such an interpretation of Harrington would enable the Court to follow the suggestion of other commentators
who would have the harmless-error test applied retroactively and the
automatic reversal test prospectively. 5 In order to avoid raising false
hopes, however, it must be admitted that the above likelihood appears
remote indeed, especially in view of the "Burger Court's" position in the
recent case of Dutton v. Evans.80
VII. THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
RULE-Bruton DIES ANOTHER DEATH
In one of the first decisions since the addition of Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court held in Dutton v.
Evans8 7 that a Georgia hearsay exception, 8 allowing declarations uttered
by a conspirator after the perpetration of a substantive offense to be admissible in evidence against all other co-conspirators, did not violate the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.89 One of the three principals in Dutton was Truett, a conspirator who was granted immunity
from prosecution in exchange for his testimony. Evans then severed his
trial from Williams, the other alleged co-conspirator. Among the twenty
witnesses90 for the state at Evans' trial was a fellow prisoner of Williams
who testified that upon returning from his arraignment Williams had
said, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we
wouldn't be in this now."9 1 This testimony was admitted into evidence by
the trial court over objection and upheld by the Supreme Court of
Georgia on the basis of the state's conspiracy statute. 2
The rule is that so long as the conspiracy to conceal the fact
that a crime has been committed or the identity of the per-.
petrators of the offense continues, the parties to such conspiracy
are to be considered so much a unit that the declarations of
either are admissible against the other.9"
85. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.

86. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
87. Id.
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954) provides that

[a]fter the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the
conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against
all.
89. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1970).

90. Justice Stewart particularly emphasized the number of prosecution witnesses, recounting the number four times in his majority opinion.
91. 400 U.S. at 77.
92. See note 88 supra.
93. Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 402, 150 S.E.2d 240, 248 (1968).
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After his conviction, Evans petitioned the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus which
was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court because it could find no "salient and cogent
reasons" for the Georgia hearsay exception, an exception considerably
broader than permitted in conspiracy trials in federal courts. 4
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit, holding that the Georgia hearsay exception was not constitutionally invalid merely because it did not "exactly coincide with the hearsay exception applicable in the entirely different context of a federal
prosecution for the substantive offense of conspiracy."9 Thus, Evans
was not denied the right of confrontation merely because he was not
able to cross-examine Williams as to whether or not he actually made
the statement attributed to him.96
Writing for the majority,9 7 Justice Stewart conluded that the case sub
judice did not "involve evidence in any sense 'crucial or devastating' "s
to the defendant as did Pointer v. Texas,9 Douglas v. Alabama,"' Brookhart v. Janis,101 Barber v. Page,'°2 and Roberts v. Russell."° ' Justice
Stewart pointed out that Dutton did not involve the "use or misuse of
a confession made in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation," ' 4
nor any "prosecutorial misconduct or negligence. 01 There was not a
94. Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 830-31 (5th Cir. 1969).
95. 400 U.S. at 83. At this juncture it appears to be reasonable to ask whether or not
this argument is merely the old procedural-substantive gambit in somewhat obfuscated garb.
If one is able to conclude from reading the Court's opinion that the majority was attempting
to rest its decision upon a procedural-substantive distinction, the next question is whether
the distinction can be adequately justified. If it can be justified then why wasn't it?
96. Id. at 89.
97. Justice Stewart was joined by Justice White. Justice Blackmun joined by Chief
Justice Burger concurred with opinion, and Justice Harlan concurred in the result.
98. 400 U.S. at 87.
99. 380 U.S. 400 (1964). In Pointer the victim of a robbery, Phillips, testified at a preliminary hearing as to the details of the robbery and identified the defendant. The defendant
was not represented by counsel and made no attempt to cross-examine Phillips. At Pointer's
subsequent trial the prosecution was permitted to introduce into evidence the transcript of
Phillips' testimony at the preliminary hearing. This was held to be a violation of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, binding upon the state through the fourteenth
amendment.
100. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
101. 384 U.S. 1 (1965). Brookhart had been "denied the right to cross-examine at all
any witnesses who testified against him . . . . There was also introduced as evidence against
him an alleged confession, made out of court by one of his codefendants . . . who did not
testify in court." The only issue in the case was one of waiver because the state conceded
that such a wholesale and complete denial of cross-examination without waiver "would be
constitutional error of the first magnitude . . . ." Id. at 3-4.
102. 390 U.S. 719 (1962). In Barber the principal evidence at trial was a transcript of
preliminary hearing testimony admitted by the trial judge under an exception to the hearsay
rule. This exception was, by its terms, applicable only if the witness was unavailable. The
Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could not use the transcript at trial without a showing
of "good faith effort" to obtain the witness' presence at trial. Id. at 725.
103. 392 U.S. 293 (1967).
104. 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970).
105. Id.
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wholesale denial of cross-examination, 0 6 nor the use of a transcript0 7
nor a joint trial.' While all of the foregoing is true, the latter two of
Justice Stewart's points merit closer inspection.
First, Dutton, unlike Barber, did not involve a transcript of testimony. This distinction seems to be more important than Justice Stewart
made it appear. It is an article of faith of a normally skeptical profession
that an oral statement made out of court is much less trustworthy than
one made in court. And while the transcription of a statement made in
open court may not insure the accuracy of the statement, it does at
least assure that the statement was actually made. Indeed, Justice Blackmun and the Chief Justice doubted whether Williams truly made the
statement attributed to him. 0 9 Unfortunately Blackmun's studied skepticism missed the point entirely. Only by affording Evans the opportunity
to cross-examine Williams could the jury have been able to ascertain
the accuracy of the statement. Without the aid of a cross-examination
of the alleged maker of the statement, the jury was forced to engage in
pure speculation as to the veracity of Shaw, a practice Justice Blackmun
unhesitatingly imitated. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, chose to
term Williams' statement a "spontaneous" declaration "against his penal
interest."" 0 This was taken to be an "indicia of reliability . . . deter-

minative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though
there is no confrontation of the declarant."' Thus Justice Stewart, unlike Justice Blackmun, assumed a fortiori the statement to be true and
properly presented to the jury for consideration.
The second distinction given a cursory analysis by Justice Stewart
was his statement that Roberts was inapplicable to Dutton because Evans
was not being tried jointly with Williams. If Bruton and Roberts have
any meaning whatsoever, it must be that Williams' statement could not
have been introduced into evidence at his joint trial with Evans because
to do so would have necessitated the use of limiting instructions declared
unconstitutional in Bruton. Consequently, if the statement could not
have been used at Evans' and Williams' joint trial, how could it be constitutionally permissible to use the same statement at Evans' severed
trial where Evans was still denied the right to confront and cross-examine
Williams, the alleged declarant? In short, has not the Supreme Court
allowed the Georgia trial court to do indirectly that which it could not
do directly?
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. I am at a loss to understand how any normal jury, as we must assume this one
to have been, could be led to believe, let alone influenced by this astonishing account
by Shaw of his conversation with Williams in a normal voice through a closed
hospital room door.
Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 89.
111. Id.
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It appears that the above problem occurred only to Justice Blackmun, who declared that-if there was error, it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 2 His reliance upon the harmless-error rule was necessitated by Georgia law requiring the corroboration of testimony given by
an accomplice." 3 Reliance upon harmless error in this instance seems
self-defeating. If Shaw's testimony was given for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the immune accomplice, Truett, then it
would appear that it "contributed" to Evans' conviction. If, on the other
hand, Justice Blackmun was correct in concluding that other record
testimony fully satisfied the corroboration requirement," 4 then the purpose of the introduction of Shaw's testimony and its questionable materiality appear to be an object of legitimate inquiry.
The only possible purpose for the introduction of Shaw's testimony,
other than the corroboration of Truett's testimony, appears to be its
prejudicial effect upon the defendant, Evans. Despite the patent ambiguity of Williams' alleged statement, it clearly stands as an accusation
by one conspirator against another."' This damaging accusation was
admitted without the benefit of cross-examination of its alleged maker
under a novel state statute" 6 which devastates the traditional view of
conspiracy and its concomitant hearsay exception. Yet the manifest
difference between Georgia's hearsay exception and the federal rule does
not, as the Supreme Court realized, automatically make the Georgia rule
unconstitutional."' It is the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
that makes the Georgia rule unconstitutional although Dutton v. Evans
is to the contrary.
Bruton and Roberts make it abundantly clear that an out of court
statement made after the commission of a substantive offense may not
be admitted into evidence without affording the defendant an opportunity
to cross-examine its alleged maker. The only salient difference between
Bruton and Dutton was that Bruton involved a federal prosecution for
armed postal robbery, whereas Dutton involved a state prosecution for
the murder of three police officers. The practice of admitting the alleged
statements of a non-testifying codefendant without affording crossexamination was held in Bruton to be repugnant to the sixth amendment.
That same amendment is also binding upon the states through the fourteenth amendment." 8 Therefore, it is difficult to see how the practice
proscribed in Bruton is made any less unconstitutional by the use of a
112. Id. at 93.
113. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could not lawfully convict upon the
strength of testimony by an accomplice alone. "The testimony .. .must be corroborated ....
[T]he corroboration . . .must be such as to connect the defendant with the criminal act."
Id. at 108.
114. Id. at 93.
115. Id. at 104.
116. See note 88 supra.
117. 400 U.S. at 83.
118. See note 99 supra.
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state statute, albeit "a long-established and well-recognized rule of state
law."' 1 9 One might well ask, after noting the complete absence of authority of reasoning to explain this result,'12 how the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment and the cases interpreting it-Bruton and
Roberts-came to be superseded by a state statute. At this point,
it is only reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation Clause
has any independent vitality at all in protecting a criminal defendant against the use of extrajudicial statements not subject
to cross-examination and not exposed to a jury assessment of the
declarant's demeanor at trial.' 2'
Dutton v. Evans suggests that it does not.
VIII.

Bruton AND Roberts

IN FLORIDA-THE SUNSHINE

STATE LEADS THE RETURN TO DARKNESS

Florida appellate courts were less than cordial in their initial greeting of Bruton and Roberts. In one of the first reported cases of the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, the court consoled a trial judge
who was being reversed on appeal that he was "not the only victim of
'Monday-morning quarterbacking.' ,122 Another trial judge had also been
reversed by the District Court of Appeal, Second District, because
the United States Supreme Court has now, after the game is over
and the score is in, said the rules are changed and the game
must be played again. The trial judge was right at the time of
the trial, but wrong at the time of appeal. 25
24
This same Third District panel also decided in Brown v. State1
that Bruton was limited merely to jury trials and did not affect a trial
judge sitting in his capacity as trier of fact. The facts of Brown are
somewhat more interesting than the specious reasoning used by the
1 During
court.' 25
the trial of Brown and his two codefendants, Brown's
private attorney received permission from the court to leave for a 6:30
P.M. appointment, entrusting his client to another attorney. This was
done upon the assurances of the state attorney that subsequent proceedings would not pertain to Brown. Once Brown's attorney had left the
courtroom, however, the state attorney moved into evidence two confessions implicating Brown made by Brown's codefendants. The Third
District refused to reverse the conviction on the grounds that a trial
119. 400 U.S. at 83.
120. Id. at 104-05.
121. Id. at 110 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan would have tested the propriety of the
admission by due process standards, a standard which "concededly [has] nothing to do with
the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 110 n.11.
122. Jones v. State, 223 So.2d 790, 791 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
123. Id., citing Branch v. State, 212 So.2d 29, 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
124. 223 So.2d 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
125. Judges Carroll, Hendry and Swann.
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judge was incapable of completely disregarding the confessions in determining Brown's guilt or innocence, holding that to do so "would be
to cast aspersions on the entire foundation of the judge's role in any
court proceeding."' 2 6
Casting aside the limited logic of Brown, a slightly different Third
District panel' 2 7 decided in Mackey v. State, 28 that although a trial
judge could be trusted to disregard highly prejudicial information in his
capacity as trier of fact, he could not be so trusted sitting in his capacity
as trier of law. This apparent conflict is not as much a representative of
conflicting logic by the Third District as it is an attempt by the court to
undo some of the harm inflicted upon Bruton by the court in Brown.
The precipitating factor in Mackey was an unsworn statement implicating Mackey, made by his codefendant after he had changed his plea to
guilty in apparent exchange for the dismissal of additional charges.12 9
Realizing that the question of whether Mackey had received a fair trial
depended on whether the trial judge could completely disregard the unsworn incriminating statement, the court concluded that if a jury could
be presumed to have been influenced by the statement, there was a
"reasonable probability" that the trial judge also could have been influenced.' 30 It is submitted that Mackey probably represented the better
interpretation of Bruton and despite the emphasis placed upon the superior training of a trial judge's mind in Brown v. State, he is still subject
to the same human prejudices which affect everyone.
The Fourth District's reaction to Bruton was less phlegmatic and
more constitutionally precise. In one opinion the court stated that Bruton
had led to the "singular conclusion that irrespective of the presence of
a defendant's inculpatory statements, prejudicial error is committed by
the use of confessions of codefendants who do not testify.' 3' Neverthe2
less, the Fourth District concluded that Harrington v. California'1
now compels us to gauge . . . the adverse effect of the use of

co-confessions against other "overwhelming" evidence of guilt.
Although we believe Bruton construed this violation of a constitutional right so basic that its infraction could never be considered as harmless, we are committed to another course. In
futuro, prosecutors will have to second guess whether to introduce co-confessions, use of which being subject to assessment by
the trial
judge and running the gauntlet of appellate reviews. So
33
be it.

126. 223 So.2d at 339.
127. Judge Hendry was replaced by Judge Barkdull.
128. 234 So.2d 418 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
129. Id. at 419.
130. Id. at 420. "Our system of law protects against the probability of unfairness, where
that appears, as well as against unfairness which is patent." Id.
131. Jones v. State, 227 So.2d 326, 327 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
132. 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See notes 72-84 supra and accompanying text.
133. 227 So.2d at 327.
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134
serves as a perfect
One such Florida case, Schneble v. Florida,'
of appellate
"gauntlet
the
runs
example of what happens to a case when it
convicted
and
tried
were
jointly
reviews." In Schneble two defendants
by a jury of first degree murder. Neither defendant testified at the trial,
but police witnesses testified as to admissions made by both defendants
implicating each other. Despite some valid questions concerning the
voluntariness of the confessions,' 3 5 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
the convictions.13' The United States Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Bruton v. United States.' Upon remand, the Supreme Court of Florida
reversed one defendant's conviction, finding that it had been obtained in
violation of Bruton, but affirmed the other conviction.' 8" The United
States Supreme Court again granted certiorari limited to the question of
whether Schneble's conviction had been obtained in violation of Bruton.
The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that any violation of Bruton
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."3
One of the first of many inconsistencies present within Schneble is
that the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed Schneble's conviction upon
remand, holding that it was "not inconsistent with Bruton."' ° However,
the United States Supreme Court per Justice Rehnquist rejected the
Supreme Court of Florida's position that Schneble could be squared with
Bruton, and yet at the same time, the Court studiously avoided passing
upon the threshhold question of whether a violation of Bruton existed.
The Court instead addressed itself to the problem that

[t]he mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule in the
course of the trial, however, does not automatically require
reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction. In some cases the
properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and
the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable
the improper use of the admission was harmless
doubt that
1
error.

14

Unfortunately, the scope of this article does not permit a detailed
analysis of the questionable harmlessness of the statements in question.' 42 It is within the purview of this article, however, to examine
134. 92 S. Ct. 1056 (1972), aff'g Schneble v. State, 215 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1968).
135. Schneble v. State, 201 So.2d 881, 883-84 (Fla. 1967); see also 92 S. Ct. 1056, 106061 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

136. Schneble v. State, 201 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1967).
137.
138.
139.
140.

Schneble v. Florida, 392 U.S. 298 (1968).
Schneble v. State, 215 So.2d 611 (Fla. 1968).
Schneble v. Florida, 92 S. Ct. 1056 (1972).
215 So.2d at 612.

141. 92 S.Ct. at 1059 (emphasis added).
142. For an excellent discussion of how the controverted statement may have contributed
to Schneble's conviction, see Justice Marshall's dissent in Schneble v. Florida, 92 S. Ct. 1056,
1060-62 (1972).
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the apparent transition of the harmless error "test" from that first enunciated in Chapman-whether the constitutional error contributed to the
conviction-to the latest definition of whether other evidence of guilt is
"so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect . .. is so insignificant by

"I"
comparison ....
It is significant to note that the author of both Chapman and
Harrington, Justice Douglas, joined Justice Marshall in dissenting in
Schneble. Justice Douglas admonished, in Chapman, against giving too
much weight to "other overwhelming evidence of guilt,"' 44 an admonition
apparently lost on Justice Rehnquist. Rehnquist came to the conclusion
that other independent evidence of guilt was "so overwhelming" that the
introduction of Schneble's codefendant's confession "was at most harmless error."' 45 But this argument proves too much, for without Schneble's
confession, Rehnquist concedes that the "State's case against Schneble
was virtually non-existent."' 4 Justice Marshall took the position that
"an average jury" might well have doubted the voluntariness of a confession induced by a 50 mile car ride commencing at 9:30 P.M. Sunday
evening, during which another police officer followed in a car shooting off
firecrackers in an attempt to convey to Schneble the impression that his
alleged accomplice was trying to "put him out of business.' 4 7 The
conclusion then becomes inescapable that it is reasonably possible that
the confession of Schneble's codefendant could have contributed to
Schneble's conviction. What prevents second guessing is that Schneble
already contains too much second-guess work. Was the taint of the
dubious tactics used by the police to secure Schneble's confession attenuated by the passage of time? Did the jury consider Schneble's confession to be voluntary or involuntary? Did the confession of Schneble's
codefendant contribute to Schneble's conviction? Was the other evidence
of Schneble's guilt really "overwhelming"? Was the other evidence of
guilt really independent?
The point which seems to have been lost on the Supreme Courts of
Florida and the United States is that Harrington made it clear that constitutional error, whether reversible or not, occurs whenever a confession
of a codefendant (which incriminates another codefendant) is admitted
into evidence without the benefit of cross-examination of its alleged
maker. Neither court has attempted to correct this constitutionally
abusive practice. Instead both courts have collaborated to issue a virtual
rubber stamp marked "Harmless Error" to be used whenever a possible
violation of Bruton rears its ugly head.
It seems somewhat anti-climactic at this point to relate that, in the
intervening period between the reaffirmation of Schneble by the Supreme
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1059.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
92 S. Ct. at 1060.

Id.
Schneble v. State, 201 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 1967).
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Court of Florida and the approval of that position by a majority of the
United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Florida prescribed
a "test"1 a for escaping the effects of Bruton. This test is to be used in
situations where the defendant was denied the opportunity of crossexamining his accusing codefendant who has also confessed. The test is
five times more complicated than Judge Frank's original proposal of
"csever or exclude ."

49

IX.

CONCLUSION

As may be seen from the foregoing discussion, constitutional law
has shown a marked aversion to simple solutions for simple problems.
Sixteen years ago a federal appeals judge had the simplest, most workable, and perhaps the fairest of all proposed solutions to the problem
created by a confessing codefendant who claims his right under the fifth
amendment not to be compelled to testify against himself. Instead of
adopting Judge Frank's proposal-sever the defendants or exclude the
confession-the Supreme Court has chosen a more torturous route.
The first departure was redaction, a legal fiction so transparent that
even the most naive of jurors must have instantly known what was transpiring. Then there was the use of limiting instructions, a triumph of form
over substance. Perhaps the biggest disadvantage accruing to the defendant by the use of limiting instructions was that the instructions had a
tendency to attract attention to the poisoned testimony. The latest device
is the harmless-error rule. It is bad enough that the concept of harmless
constitutional error exists at all, with no language whatsoever in the
Constitution to support it. It is even worse when the "test" changes from
opinion to opinion, amounting in Schneble to little more than a sufficiency
of the evidence test.
It must be remembered that Harrington and Schneble make it
abundantly clear that federal constitutional error, whether reversible or
not, occurs whenever the confession of a non-testifying defendant, which
confession implicates his codefendant, is introduced into evidence at their
joint trial. Therefore, it is suggested that a bona fide motion for severance
alleging that a defendant, joined in the indictment or information, has
148. State v. Stubbs, 239 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1970).

[W]here the confessions of all the defendants affirm substantially the same material
facts of the offense charged; where there appears to be sufficient independent proof
of the unquestionable guilt of each party; where the confession of the defendant is
given freely and voluntarily, and with reasonable independence of confessions of
co-defendants; where no unfavorable evidence is introduced at a defendant's joint
trial separately; and where instructions are given to the jury to disregard statements
admitted into evidence against one defendant and not against another; that where
these requirements are met, the risk of "prejudicial spillover" incrimination without
cross-examination is reduced to an insignificant level.
Id. at 242.
It appears that Schneble v. State violated the Supreme Court of Florida's test on at
least points two and three.
149. See note 27 supra.
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confessed implicating the movant, that the state intends to introduce this
confession into evidence at the joint trial, and that the declarant intends
to claim his privilege against self incrimination, constitutes a showing of
"probable prejudice"15 sufficient to justify a severance. Under such circumstances the denial of a motion for severance would seem tantamount
to a hope that other "overwhelming" evidences of guilt could later be
found on appeal.
150. Where from the nature of the case it appears that a joint trial probably would
be prejudicialto the rights of one or more parties, a separate trial should be granted
when properly requested.
Reddick v. State, 190 So.2d 340, 347 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), quoting Suarez v. State, 95 Fla.
42, 50, 115 So. 519, 522 (1928) (emphasis added).

